CRIMINAL LAW—KOSILEK v. MALONEY: IN PRISON WHILE IMPRISONED IN THE BODY OF THE OPPOSITE SEX: EXAMINING THE ISSUE OF  CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT  PRESENTED BY AN INCARCERATED TRANSSEXUAL by Andreopoulos, Nikolas
Western New England Law Review
Volume 27 27 (2005)
Issue 2 Article 3
12-16-2009
CRIMINAL LAW—KOSILEK v. MALONEY:
IN PRISON WHILE IMPRISONED IN THE
BODY OF THE OPPOSITE SEX: EXAMINING
THE ISSUE OF "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT" PRESENTED BY AN
INCARCERATED TRANSSEXUAL
Nikolas Andreopoulos
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nikolas Andreopoulos, CRIMINAL LAW—KOSILEK v. MALONEY: IN PRISON WHILE IMPRISONED IN THE BODY OF THE
OPPOSITE SEX: EXAMINING THE ISSUE OF "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT" PRESENTED BY AN
INCARCERATED TRANSSEXUAL, 27 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 219 (2005), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol27/
iss2/3
NOTES 

CRIMINAL LAW - KOSILEK V. MALONEY: IN PRISON WHILE 
IMPRISONED IN THE BODY OF THE OPPOSITE SEX: EXAMINING THE 
ISSUE OF "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT" PRESENTED BY AN 
INCARCERATED TRANSSEXUAL 
INTRODUCTION 
When the State takes a person into its custody and holds him 
there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corre­
sponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and 
general well being. . .. The rationale for this principle is simple 
enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power 
so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to 
care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his 
basic human needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, 
and reasonable safety - it transgresses the substantive limits on 
state action set by the Eighth Amendment. ...1 
While the rationale for this principle may be simple, the issues 
raised by the incarceration of those experiencing intense Gender 
Identity Disorder (hereinafter "GID") are not. Inmates experienc­
ing the rare psychological condition of GID pose serious and diffi­
cult questions to those responsible for their medical care and, in 
certain circumstances, prison personnel may be found to have vio­
lated the constitutional prohibition of "cruel and unusual punish­
ments" by not providing proper treatment for the inmate.2 The 
case of Kosilek v. Maloney3 addressed the unique issues involved 
with the treatment of transsexual inmates in a comprehensive way, 
which had not previously been done by a court. The court's general 
approach and thorough analysis of the issues presented is the sub­
ject of this Note. 
Kosilek was decided by a federal district court in Massachu­
1. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989». 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
3. 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002). 
219 
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setts and is significant in a couple of ways. First, it provides the 
most comprehensive analysis of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
in the context of incarcerating transsexuals. No other court at the 
federal level has considered this difficult issue as thoroughly as in 
Kosilek. Second, it provides guidance to prison administrators 
faced with the difficult task of incarcerating transsexuals. The opin­
ion can be viewed as establishing a framework for prison adminis­
trators to be used in order to avoid violating the prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment. The decision is constitutionally sound 
given prior case law and the current understanding of GID and its 
potential seriousness. Therefore, the case may have additional sig­
nificance outside of the First Circuit.4 
Michelle Kosilek is, for the most part, an unsympathetic liti­
gant. Kosilek is a convicted murderer currently serving a life-sen­
tence, without the possibility of parole, in a medium-security 
Massachusetts prison for the murder of his former wife, Cheryl Mc­
Caul.s Kosilek is anatomically male and suffers from GID, a rare 
psychological condition marked by intense and persistent desires to 
live life as a member of the opposite sex.6 Kosilek has been incar­
cerated at MCI-Norfolk since 1994 and has been in the custody of 
the Department of Corrections (hereinafter "DOC") since 1993.7 
During the period in which the DOC has been responsible for 
Kosilek, he attempted suicide twice and also attempted to castrate 
himself.8 Kosilek's unique condition placed those responsible for 
his care, and ultimately DOC Commissioner Michael Maloney, in a 
difficult position. 
On the one hand, the responsible officials knew that Kosilek 
was in need of psychiatric care, having been diagnosed by a profes­
sional with experience in treating GID.9 Therefore, under the 
Eighth Amendment, DOC personnel could not neglect his medical 
condition. The DOC also knew that if Kosilek was not treated 
properly the risk of suicide would be great.lO On the other hand, 
4. Indeed Kosilek has already provided guidance to federal courts addressing the 
difficult problems raised by the incarceration of transsexuals. See Barrett v. Coplan, 292 
F. Supp. 2d 281 (Dist. N.H. 2003); Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
5. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 164. The particular facts of the case also led the 
jury to find Kosilek guilty of extreme atrocity in the murder of McCaul. See Common­
wealth v. Kosilek, 668 N.E.2d 808, 811-12 (Mass. 1996). 
6. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 159. 
7. Id. at 164. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 190. 
10. Id. 
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the treatment options involved in treating OlD were politically con­
troversial, expensive, and potentially disruptive of prison security.ll 
Fearful of the potential political backlash and concerned with the 
administration of the prison, Commissioner Maloney decided not to 
provide the recommended course of treatment and claimed that the 
DOC was not constitutionally obligated to do SO.12 In response, 
Kosilek brought a civil rights action to enforce his Eighth Amend­
ment right to medical care.13 
Determining whether an Eighth Amendment violation oc­
curred was a close question. Although the Eighth Amendment pro­
vides substantial protection for prison officials, as Kosilek explains, 
it is not impenetrable. In the end, the court found that Commis­
sioner Maloney had not violated the Eighth Amendment because 
his actions in dealing with Kosilek's condition were not the result of 
"deliberate indifference."14 Despite holding in favor of the DOC, 
the Kosilek decision can be viewed as a warning to those responsi­
ble for the care of transsexual inmates. The decision in part pro­
vides what should, and should not, be done by prison officials when 
faced with the difficult situation of incarcerating persons with 
01D.15 The court's thorough examination of such a thorny legal 
problem is constitutionally sound as the law exists today; thus 
courts and prison officials should be aware of Kosilek in order to 
assure compliance with the Eighth Amendment and thereby avoid 
potential liability. 
This Note addresses the various issues involved in the Kosilek 
decision, including whether transsexual inmates should be allowed 
individualized medical evaluations; whether prison policies which 
severely restrict access to treatment are proper; the role of political 
consequences in the decision process used by prison officials re­
sponsible for the medical care of prisoners; and the issue of cost as a 
factor of constitutional magnitude. To achieve this end, this Note 
11. [d. at 162. 
12. [d. at 170-71. 
13. [d. at 159. 
14. [d. at 191. 
15. [d. at 160-61. The court expanded on what adequate care entails: "Adequate 
care requires treatment by qualified personnel, who provide services that are of a qual­
ity acceptable when measured by prudent professional standards in the community. 
Adequate care is tailored to an inmate's particular medical needs and is based on medi­
cal considerations." [d. The court also mentioned that it would not be "permissible to 
deny an inmate adequate medical care because it is costly. In recognition of this, prison 
officials at times authorize CAT scans, dialysis, and other forms of expensive medical 
care required to diagnose or treat familiar forms of serious illness." [d. 
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begins by discussing several related concepts. Part I of this Note 
concerns the judicial construction of the cruel and unusual clause of 
the Eighth Amendment and examines the deliberate indifference 
standard, which is used to assess whether a violation of the Amend­
ment has occurred. This Part provides analysis of the important 
developments in Eighth Amendment interpretation, including the 
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Estelle v. Gamble,16 and pro­
vides discussion of deliberate indifference in the medical treatment 
context. Part II includes a discussion of GID and provides analysis 
of earlier cases that involved challenges brought by incarcerated 
transsexuals. Part III discusses the facts of the Kosilek case as well 
as the court's holding. Finally, Part IV explores the Kosilek opinion 
and provides analysis of the decision. The purpose of this Note is to 
examine the impact the Kosilek decision may have on future actions 
brought by incarcerated transsexualsP This Note proposes tJ;1at the 
Kosilek approach serve as a model for future cases because it best 
comports with Supreme Court precedent and notions which under­
lie the Eighth Amendment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. 	 Judicial Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in the 
Modern Era 
The roots of the contemporary deliberate indifference stan­
dard, which is used to determine whether a prison official has vio­
lated a prisoner's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel 
and unusual punishment, can be traced back to the middle part of 
the twentieth century. It was around this time that the essential 
problem regarding the scope of the Eighth Amendment began to be 
considered.18 Despite the unresolved issue regarding the applica­
bility of the Amendment to the states,19 the Supreme Court case of 
16. 429 u.s. 97 (1976). 
17. See supra note 4. 
18. See Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660, 675 (1962) ("The command of the 
Eighth Amendment banning 'cruel and unusual punishments,' stems for the Bill of 
Rights of 1688. . .. And it is applicable to the States by reason of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citation omitted). During this period, the 
Fourteenth Amendment was "assumed" to be the principle basis for applying the 
Eighth Amendment to the states. See Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947). 
This "assumption" would not be formally confirmed by the Supreme Court until years 
later. 
19. Francis, 329 U.S. at 462 (The Court stated that "we shall examine the circum­
stances under the assumption, but without so deciding, that violation of the principles of 
the Fifth and Eight Amendments ... would be violative of the .due process clause of the 
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Francis v. Resweber20 made important, albeit limited, interpreta­
tions concerning the potential for liability under the Amendment.21 
1\vo significant findings the Court made were that the Amendment 
prohibited "the wanton infliction of pain" and that a violation of 
the Amendment could not result from an "unforeseeable acci­
dent."22 The Court interpreted the prohibition of "cruel and unu­
sual punishment" to involve a mens rea component, and this 
concept would ultimately serve an important role in the construc­
tion of the Eighth Amendment. The mens rea requirement would 
be formally accepted by the Supreme Court twenty-nine years later 
in the landmark Eighth Amendment case of Estelle v. Gamble.23 
1. Estelle v. Gamble 
In Estelle, the Supreme Court established a framework to 
guide courts in determining whether an Eighth Amendment viola­
tion occurred.24 For the first time, the Supreme Court began the 
difficult task of restricting the limits of the indefinite cruel and unu­
sual clause in a meaningful way.25 The standard established by the 
Court incorporated the Eighth Amendment's guiding principles, 
announced by earlier Supreme Court decisions,26 which viewed the 
Fourteenth Amendment. "); see also LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 7, 14 (1975). 
20. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
21. Francis, 329 U.S. at 463. 
22. ld. at 463-64. 
23. 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) ("We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference 
to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction 
of pain,' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment."). 
24. ld. 
25. [d. at 105-06. The Court's opinion makes clear that not 
every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment 
states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. . .. In order to state a cogniza­
ble claim a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evi­
dence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such 
indifference that can offend 'evolving standards of decency' in violation of the 
Eight Amendment. 
[d. Despite the fact that Estelle involved allegations of inadequate medical care, the 
analysis that the Court set out would become the appropriate standard for most types of 
mistreatment alleged by inmate plaintiffs and would extend beyond the medical treat­
ment context. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) ("[O]bduracy and wan­
tonness ... characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause, whether the conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of con­
finement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous 
cellblock."). 
26. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370-74 (1910). In Weems, the ma­
jority opinion stated: 
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an 
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Amendment as progressive and concerning "evolving standards of 
decency that mark progress in a maturing society."27 The deliber­
ate indifference standard crafted by the Court can therefore be con­
sidered an attempt to reconcile the lofty notions of "evolving 
standards of decency" and "dignity of man," which underlie the 
Eighth Amendment, with a specific legal analysis with which courts 
could work.28 The resulting method was one that assessed not only 
objective criteria but also the subjective motivation of the responsi­
ble prison official, against whom allegations were lodged. This 
combination of the objective and subjective became the basis for 
determining whether a valid Eighth Amendment claim exists.29 
By establishing that only a finding of deliberate indifference, or 
the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," would constitute a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment,3° Estelle precluded liability for 
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessa­
rily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, 
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be 
vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it 
birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enact­
ments, designed to meet passing occasions. 
Id. at 373. See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). In Trap, the Court again 
recognized that the language in the Amendment does little in the way of providing 
precise meaning. In reversing a sentence that would have taken away the citizenship of 
the native born petitioner who had been convicted of wartime desertion, the Court 
stated that: "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than 
the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to 
assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." Id. at 100. 
The Court also stated that: "The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 101. 
27. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. See also Trap, 356 U.S. at 101. 
28. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 ("In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must 
allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to seri­
ous medical needs. It is only such indifference .that can offend 'evolving standards of 
decency' in violation of the Eight Amendment."). 
29. Id. at 101, 106 (acknowledging that more recent Supreme Court decisions go 
beyond obvious physical punishments, which would of course violate the Amendment, 
and requiring a showing of "deliberate indifference" in order for liability to be imposed 
under the Eighth Amendment). 
30. Id. at 104-05. The majority stated: 
We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of 
prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' ... pro­
scribed by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is 
manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by 
prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or 
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of 
how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury 
states a cause of action under § 1983. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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the harm to prisoners so long as responsible prison officials acted 
appropriately.31 The deliberate indifference standard also ad­
vanced the mens rea concept mentioned in Francis to now require a 
culpable state of mind beyond mere neglect.32 Following Estelle, it 
has become clear that the Court has accepted the deliberate indif­
ference standard as the proper measure of whether an Eight 
Amendment violation exists in practically all aspects of prison 
administration.33 
The Estelle decision did little in terms of defining the scope of 
liability under the deliberate indifference standard. Estelle did, 
however, confirm "that the Amendment proscribes more than 
physically barbarous punishments. "34 At the same time, the opin­
ion recognized the aspiring beliefs of humanity and decency, which 
underlie the Amendment.35 The standard announced in Estelle can 
therefore be seen as a flexible method to be used by courts on an ad 
hoc basis when evaluating penal measures against the "broad ideal­
istic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and de­
cency."36 To further understand "deliberate indifference" and its 
31. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) ("To be cruel and unusual 
punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more 
than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety. This reading of the 
Clause underlies our decision in Estelle."). 
32. See Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (finding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibited "the wanton infliction of pain" and that no liability would exist 
for an "unforeseeable accident"); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 (accepting that acci­
dents, whether in the medical context or not, are insufficient to satisfy the mens rea 
component of the Eighth Amendment). 
33. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 
503 U.S. 1,6-7 (1992» ("[A]pplication of the deliberate indifference standard is inap­
propriate ... when officials stand accused of using excessive physical force."). Accord­
ing to the Farmer Court: 
In such situations, where the decisions of prison officials are made "in haste, 
under pressure, and frequently without the lUXUry of a second chance," an 
Eighth Amendment claimant must show more than "indifference," deliberate 
or otl1erwise. The claimant must show that officials applied force "maliciously 
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm . . . ." 
Id. at 835 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6). See also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,303 
(1991) (quoting LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (C.A.4, N.C. 1987» ("Whether one char­
acterizes the treatment received by [the prisoner] as inhumane conditions of confine­
ment, failure to attend to his medical needs, or a combination of both, it is appropriate 
to apply the 'deliberate indifference' standard articulated in Estelle."). 
34. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. See also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302. In Wilson, the Court acknowledged that 
determining an individual's intent depends on the circumstances. Id. (citing Whitley, 
475 U.S. at 320) ("[O]ur cases say that the offending conduct must be wanton. Whitley 
makes clear, however, that in this context wantonness does not have a fixed meaning 
226 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:219 
potential scope of liability, it is helpful to analyze other Supreme 
Court cases that have applied the standard. 
B. Judicial Construction of the Deliberate Indifference Standard 
Further clarification of "deliberate indifference" came in 1991, 
when the Court applied the standard in Wilson v. Seiter37 and dis­
tinguished the case from an earlier decision in Rhodes v. Chap­
man.38 While both cases involved complaints relating to conditions 
of confinement,39 in Rhodes the Court never thoroughly assessed 
the prison official's subjective motivation because the claim failed 
during the analysis of the objective component of deliberate indif­
ference.4o Wilson established that after a determination based on 
an objective injury is made, a court must then assess the constraints 
placed on the official in order to determine whether the appropriate 
level of "wantonness" is present.41 Thus, Wilson's clarification of 
Rhodes aided in the interpretation of the deliberate indifference 
analysis by setting out a two-step inquiry. First, under Rhodes, 
courts must consider the objective factors relating to the claim.42 If 
there are insufficient objective indicia the claim fails immediately at 
that point.43 However, if the claim survives analysis under the ob­
jective component, courts must consider the subjective 
component.44 
The most in-depth explanation of deliberate indifference came 
in Farmer v. Brennan,45 which is also the only Supreme Court deci­
but must be determined with 'due regard for differences in the kind of conduct against 
which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged.' "). 
37. 501 U.S. at 294. 
38. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
39. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 29.6; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348-49. 
40. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (finding claim which alleged "double ceiling" as vio­
lative of constitutional right lacking because no sufficient medical, sanitary, or dietary 
deprivation existed). See also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (clari­
fying Rhodes to make certain that it was not to be understood as a departure from the 
subjective requirement of deliberate indifference, and reaffirming the notion that a vio­
lation of the Eighth Amendment requires a subjective component). 
41. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303 ("[A]ssuming the conduct is harmful enough to satisfy 
the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, whether it can be character­
ized as 'wanton' depends upon the constraints facing the official.") (citation omitted). 
42. Id. at 298. 
43. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. 
44. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300-01. Staying true to deliberate indifference, the Court 
stated that the subjective requirement, on the part of the prison official, partly deter­
mined whether an Eighth Amendment violation existed. Id. 
45. 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (admitting that deliberate indifference had never 
been thoroughly explained). 
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sion involving a transsexual litigant. Farmer augmented the delib­
erate indifference definition by asserting that it encompassed "more 
than mere negligence" but less than "acts or omissions for the very 
purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result."46 
The Court added "that acting or failing to act with deliberate indif­
ference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the 
equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk."47 This statement 
suggests that deliberate indifference is closely related to the notion 
of recklessness; however, the Court was uncomfortable with this 
notion, in part because of the varying legal interpretations of the 
latter term.48 Consequently, the Court rejected a deliberate indif­
ference definition that would be analogous to a civil law interpreta­
tion of recklessness49 and in the process refined deliberate 
indifference, expanding the concept beyond the recklessness notion 
found in the criminal law. 50 
The Court's justification for this expansion of deliberate indif­
ference, beyond the bounds of both criminal and civil law interpre­
tations of recklessness, ultimately related to the language in the 
Eighth Amendment itself.51 At the heart of deliberate indifference 
is the understanding that "[t]he Eighth Amendment does not out­
law cruel and unusual 'conditions'; it outlaws cruel and unusual 
46. [d. ("With deliberate indifference lying somewhere between the poles of neg­
ligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other, the Courts of Appeals have 
routinely equated deliberate indifference with recklessness."). 
47. [d. at 836. 
48.. [d. at 836-37. The Court compared the civil law definition of recklessness 
with the criminal law definition: 
The civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a 
duty to act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is 
either known or so obvious that it should be known. The criminal law, how­
ever, generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a person disregards 
a risk of harm of which he is aware. 
[d. (citation omitted). 
49. [d. at 837 (rejecting argument that liability should be found because of the 
obvious and unreasonable risk allegedly posed by the responsible official). 
50. [d. The Farmer Court recognized the criminal law notion of recklessness to 
mean disregarding a risk of harm of which the person is aware. Ultimately, the Court 
expanded this definition by not only requiring an awareness of risk, but also by requir­
ing the individual to draw an inference that would make the official completely aware 
of the risk. 
Sl. [d. ("This [deliberate indifference] approach comports best with the text of 
the Amendment as our cases have interpreted it."). See also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 
294, 300 (1991) ("[T]he source of the intent requirement is not predilections of this 
Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual 
punishment."). 
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'punishments.' "52 In the end, Farmer unmistakably stressed the im­
portance of establishing the requisite subjective motivation on the 
part of the responsible official in order for an Eighth Amendment 
violation to exist.53 Farmer thus once again reaffirmed the notion 
that deliberate indifference cannot be found by the fact-finder with­
out a definite determination that the responsible official acted, or 
"punished" the prisoner, with a culpable state of mind.54 Notwith­
standing this overall emphasis on the subjective component, the 
Farmer opinion also acknowledged that objective aspects of incar­
ceration were relevant and could amount to an important societal 
interest.55 
The emphasis on the subjective motivation of the prison offi­
cial was not a novel concept, but was nonetheless controversial. In 
Francis, the majority opined that the Eighth Amendment prohib­
ited "the wanton infliction of pain."56 In that case, the dissenting 
justices recognized the inherent difficulty of analyzing the actions of 
the individual responsible for the resulting harm in terms of motiva­
tion, deliberation, and intent.57 The dissenters presciently identi­
fied an issue, which would be debated by future justices58 until 
52. Farmer, 511 U.S at 837. 
53. Id. at 838 ("[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should 
have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases 
be condemned as the infliction of punishment."). 
54. See id. at 837; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 ("If the pain inflicted is not formally 
meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element 
must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify."). 
55. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38 ("An act or omission unaccompanied by knowl­
edge of a significant risk of harm might well be something society wishes to discourage, 
and if harm does result society might well wish to assure compensation. The common 
law reflects such concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis."). 
56. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947). 
57. Id. Referring to the attempted electrocution of the prisoner and the subjec­
tive component as it relates to the executioner, the Court stated that "[l]ack of intent 
that the first application be less than fatal is not material. The intent of the executioner 
cannot lessen the torture or excuse the result. It was the statutory duty of the state 
officials to make sure that there was not failure." Id. 
58. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 851 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated: "I agree with 
Justice Stevens that inhumane prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment even if 
no prison official has an improper, subjective state of mind." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 851 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackmun also believed that deliberate indifference was 
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Amendment and stated "there is no rea­
son to believe that, in adopting the Eighth Amendment, the Framers intended to pro­
hibit cruel and unusual punishments only when they were inflicted intentionally." Id. at 
856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Using a more textual critique, Justice Thomas consid­
ered the Estelle opinion mistaken because the harm in that case had nothing to do with 
the sentence which individual received. Id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas 
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settled by the majority in Estelle and reaffirmed in Farmer. Estelle, 
appropriate or not, requires the trier of fact to determine the intent 
or wantonness of the responsible prison official before imposing lia­
bility.59 Despite arguments against applying the deliberate indiffer­
ence standard,60 Estelle remains controlling and prior dissenters, 
from Justices Thomas to Stevens, have concurred in cases requiring 
an assessment of the official's subjective motivation and considered 
them as consistent with precedent.61 
C. 	 The Deliberate Indifference Standard in the Medical Treatment 
Context 
Estelle established that it was "elementary" to recognize the 
"government's obligation to provide medical care for those whom it 
is punishing by incarceration."62 Therefore, in the medical care 
context, the decision can be seen as an acceptance of the long­
standing idea that society itself bears the burden of caring for the 
criminal element of society.63 Estelle also affirmed that knowledge 
interpreted the scope of the Amendment as involving only the sentence, or "punish­
ment" which is imposed on the individual, and not the prison conditions in which the 
convict eventually finds himself. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Wilson, 501 U.S. 
at 306 (White, J., concurring). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens signed onto 
Justice White's concurrence, which argued that the deliberate indifference standard is 
inappropriate in determining whether the conditions of prison violate the Eighth 
Amendment. Id. (White, J., concurring). The justices' main concern was that prison 
officials could escape liability even when they had knowledge of serious deprivations to 
prisoners, but were unable to remedy the deprivations because of some aspect outside 
their control and thus not liable because they lacked the requisite intent or wantonness. 
Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring). It seems that the fundamental disagreement relates 
directly to interpreting the purpose of the Amendment and whether the prohibition of 
"cruel and unusual punishments" was intended to regulate improper behavior by prison 
officials or whether it serves to provide a broad protection from harm irrespective of 
motive, intent, or wantonness. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 857 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
Justice Blackmun stated: 
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was not adopted to protect prison 
officials with arguably benign intentions from lawsuits. The Eighth Amend­
ment guarantees each prisoner that reasonable measures will be taken to en­
sure his safety ... the Eighth Amendment [may be] violated regardless of 
whether there is an easily identifiable wrongdoer with poor intentions. 
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
59. 	 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. 
60. See Michael Cameron Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provi­
sion of Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 921, 937-38 (1992) (arguing that Eighth Amendment challenges might 
be more appropriately analyzed under a gross negligence standard). 
61. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858-62 (Stevens, J., and Thomas, J., concurring) (con­
currence was hesitant). 
62. 	 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
63. 	 Id. at 103-04. For Estelle, 
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of a prisoner's need for medical care, combined with a refusal to 
provide such care, would constitute deliberate indifference and thus 
violate the Eighth Amendment.64 However, many cases, including 
Kosilek, do not fit neatly within this kind of scenario, and therefore, 
a more in depth understanding of deliberate indifference in the 
medical treatment context is necessary. 
In Estelle, the Court was certain that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited responsible officials from being deliberately indifferent 
towards serious medical needs of prisoners.65 The decision came at 
a time when the "hands off" approach, which had been used exten­
sively in the past, had begun to diminish.66 During the "hands off" 
era, in response to Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners 
whose central allegation challenged the discretion of the medical 
authority, most courts deferred to the decisions of the medical per­
sonne1.67 However, there had never been a total disregard for pris­
oners' right to medical treatment. Even before Estelle, courts had 
found that an intentional failure to provide medical treatment for 
prisoners would constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment.68 
Since the deliberate indifference standard was announced, the 
Court has stated that a prison official responsible for providing 
medical care would be in violation of the Eighth Amendment if the 
prisoner could demonstrate that there was a "serious medical need" 
The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary 
standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation codifying the com­
mon-law view that "it is but just that the public be required to care for the 
prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for 
himself." 
Id. (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926». 
64. Id. at 104-06. The Estelle Court concluded that "an inadvertent failure to 
provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute 'an unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain' or to be 'repugnant to the conscious of mankind.'" Id. at 105-06. 
However, it also noted that deliberate indifference can be "manifested by prison doc­
tors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally deny­
ing or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with treatment once 
prescribed." Id. at 104-05. 
65. Id. at 104 ("[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment. "). 
66. Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the 
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 506 (1963) (explaining the "hands off" doc­
trine as "a denial of jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitions from prisoners 
alleging some form of mistreatment or contesting some deprivation undergone during 
imprisonment"). 
67. See BERKSON, supra note 19, at 132. 
68. See Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Talley v. 
Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. Ark. 1965). 
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which the official intentionally neglected.69 It makes no difference, 
for purposes of Eighth Amendment liability, that the underlying 
complaint concerns the inadequacy of medical treatment as op­
posed to a total lack thereof.7° There is no deliberate indifference 
exception made for claims based on inadequacies of medical treat­
menU1 Therefore, the prisoner must simply prove that he or she 
suffered from a serious illness and that the prison official acted with 
the requisite culpable intent in not providing treatment or by pro­
viding inadequate treatment. Each of these elements will be dis­
cussed in turn. 
1. 	 The Medical Need That the Prisoner Alleges Has Not 
Been Adequately Treated Must Be "Sufficiently 
Serious" 
The Supreme Court has succinctly stated that the "deprivation 
alleged must be, objectively, 'sufficiently serious'" in order for a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment to exist.72 The Court has also 
stated that the objective requirement would be fulfilled when the 
responsible official's act or omission resulted "in the denial of the 
'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.' "73 It is important 
to appreciate the use of the word "minimal" because there is no 
doubt among the legal community that prisoners are not entitled to 
ideal care.74 The "sufficiently serious" requirement applies equally 
to allegations involving physical ills as well as claims concerning 
psychological illness. There is no dispute among courts as to the 
similarity between physical and psychological problems.75 Both re­
69. 	 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
70. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (finding "no significant distinc­
tion between claims alleging inadequate medical care and those alleging inadequate 
conditions of confinement"). 
71. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 ("In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must 
allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to seri­
ous medical needs. "). 
72. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 
298). 
73. 	 [d. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). 
74. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349 ("The Constitution 
'does not mandate comfortable prisons,' but neither does it permit inhumane ones 
....")); Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1493-94 (11th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1987); Tillery v. Owens, 719 F. Supp. 
1256, 1305 (W.D. Pa. 1989). 
75. See Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991) ("The extension of 
the eighth amendment's protection from physical health needs, as presented in Estelle, 
to mental health needs is appropriate because, as courts have noted, there is 'no under· 
lying distinction between the right to medical care for physical ills and its psychological 
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quire adequate medical treatment. Thus, a prison official who ex­
hibits deliberate indifference towards a prisoner's mental health 
needs would be in violation of the Eighth Amendment,76 
Courts agree that "a condition that a reasonable physician 
would deem worthy of treatment and which, if left untreated, could 
result in further significant injury to the inmate or the wanton inflic­
tion of pain" constitutes a sufficiently serious need.77 Categories of 
serious medical conditions recognized by courts have been those 
involving "highly contagious or dangerous conditions for which 
treatment is mandated by statutes;78 those conditions diagnosed as 
serious by medical personnel and which threaten substantial harm if 
left untreated;79 ... chronic disabilities and afflictions;80 and condi­
tions which may result in serious injury when requests for their 
treatment are denied."81 Significantly, a serious medical need that 
has been misdiagnosed by a medical professional could not amount 
to deliberate indifference, and thus, no Eighth Amendment viola­
tion would result.82 
or psychiatric counterpart."') (citation omitted); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th 
Cir. 1988); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983). 
76. See Torraco, 923 F.2d at 234; Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 92 (8th Cir. 1990); 
Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990). 
77. See Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); 
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997); Simkus v. Granger, No. 91­
6303,1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16751, *5 (4th Cir. July 30,1991); Boateng v. O'Toole, No. 
Civ.A.96-12015-RGS, 1997 WL 828 778, at *1 (D. Mass. May 30, 1997). 
78. Victoria Pappas, Note, In Prison With AIDS: The Constitutionality Of Mass 
Screening and Segregation Policies, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 151, 164 (1988) (citing French 
v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910,918 (S.D. Ind. 1982». See also Damon Martin, Comment, 
State Prisoners' Rights to Medical Treatment: Merely Elusive, or Wholly Illusory?, 8 
BLACK L.J. 427, 441 (1983). 
79. Pappas, supra note 78, at 164 (citing West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 
1978); Freeman v. Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 1974); Derrickson v. Keve, 
390 F. Supp. 905, 906-07 (D. Del. 1975». 
80. Id. (citing Barksdale v. King, 699 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1983); Hamilton v. 
Roth, 624 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1980); McDaniel v. Rhodes, 512 F. Supp. 117, 120 
(S.D. Ohio 1981); Speed v. Adams, 502 F. Supp. 426, 428 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Johnson v. 
Harris, 479 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1979». 
81. Id. (citing Freeman, 503 F.2d at 1017). 
82. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). According to Estelle, 
in the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical 
care cannot be said to constitute "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain" or to be "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Thus, a complaint 
that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condi­
tion does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
Id. 
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2. Evaluating the Treatment the Prisoner Receives 
The next step in determining whether a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment exists requires an evaluation of the treatment that the 
prisoner actually received. On the one hand, the Supreme Court 
has confirmed "that 'the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and 
the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny 
under the Eighth Amendment.' "83 On the other hand, it is clear 
that mere disagreement with the chosen medical treatment cannot 
be the basis of a cognizable constitutional claim.84 When courts 
consider these two contradictory notions in deciding Eighth 
Amendment claims brought by transsexual prisoners, problems 
often arise. 
For example, in Kosilek, the court concluded that the appropri­
ate method for determining whether the prisoner received adequate 
treatment should involve an evaluation of the treatment in relation 
to the professional medical standards practiced in the community.85 
The court went on to state that the treatment a prisoner receives 
should be individualized and specific to the unique medical require­
ments of that prisoner.86 However, this is a somewhat novel strat­
egy, and courts have been more prone to utilize a balancing system 
and consider a host of factors before determining whether an in­
mate possesses a valid constitutional claim.87 In the end, the deter­
83. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 
509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). 
84. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980); Bowring v. Godwin, 
551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F.2d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 1973); 
Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1970); Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 
2d 156, 160 (D. Mass. 2002). 
85. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 160 ("Adequate care requires treatment by quali­
fied personnel, who provide services that are of quality acceptable when measured by 
prudent professional standards in the community. "). 
86. Id. ("Adequate care is tailored to an inmate's particular medical needs and is 
based on medical considerations."). 
87. See Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1981). The court recited fac­
tors which have been considered relevant to a balancing approach as: 
the seriousness of the prisoner's illness, the need for immediate treatment, the 
likely duration of his incarceration, the possibility of substantial harm caused 
by postponed treatment, the prospects of some cure or substantial improve­
ment in his condition, and the extent to which the prisoner presents a risk of 
danger to himself or other inmates. On the other hand, the court should con­
sider the availability and expense of providing psychiatric treatment and the 
effect of such unusual care on ordinary jail administration. In balancing the 
needs of the prisoner against the burden on the penal system, [courts] should 
be mindful that the essential test is one of medical necessity and not one sim­
ply of desirability. 
Id. 
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mination depends on the particular facts - especially the extent of 
treatment involved.88 When GID is at issue, the analysis becomes 
more complicated. In order to comprehend the difficulties that 
prison administrators, and eventually courts, face in dealing with 
constitutional challenges brought by transsexual inmates, it is help­
ful to understand GID and its potentially serious effects. 
II. GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER 
In the past, GID has been referred to by courts as "gender 
dysphoria" or "transsexualism," which are older terms used to iden­
tify the condition.89 A simplistic definition of GID might character­
ize the condition as involving a belief that one is "trapped" in the 
body of the opposite sex.90 However, the primary criteria which 
medical professionals use in diagnosing GID involves evidence of a 
strong and persistent desire to be a member of the opposite sex, 
which accompanies a persistent discomfort about one's assigned sex 
and entails significant distress or impairment of functioning in soci­
ety.91 The definitions adopted by courts are consistent with medical 
definitions and stress the discomfort associated with the illness.92 
The Supreme Court definition of transsexual is "one who has '[a] 
rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently uncom­
fortable about his or her anatomical sex,' and who typically seeks 
medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to 
bring about a permanent sex change."93 
GID seriously affects the lives of those who suffer from it and 
is considered by the majority of the medical community to be bio­
88. See id. 
89. See Debra Sherman Tedeschi, The Predicament of the Transsexual Prisoner, 5 
TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REv. 27,29-30 (1995) (noting that while courts use the two 
terms interchangeably, gender dysphoria is a broad term, and transsexualism is a partic­
ular type of gender dysphoria). 
90. MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION, Home Edition, Sect. 7, Mental 
Health Disorders. ch. 87. 
91. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM-IV-TR: Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 578 [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR). 
92. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,829 (1994). See also Ulane v. Eastern 
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984) (describing transsexualism as "a 
condition that exists when a physiologically normal person (i.e., not a hermaphrodite ­
a person whose sex is not clearly defined due to a congenital condition) experiences 
discomfort or discontent about nature's choice of his or her particular sex and prefers to 
be the other sex"); PhiIIips v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 731 F. Supp. 792, 793 (W.D. Mich. 
1990) (describing the plaintiffs disorder as "discomfort and rejection of one's gender 
based on physical characteristics and sex assigned at birth"). 
93. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829 (citation omitted). 
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logical and innate. Adults with GID may exhibit an intense desire 
to not only take on the physical characteristics of the opposite sex, 
but also to adopt the social role associated with that gender.94 The 
uncomfortable feelings associated with GID may lead adults to 
"adopt the behavior, dress, and mannerisms of the other sex."95 It 
is difficult to determine how prevalent GID is; however, statistics 
from smaller European countries have shown thOat roughly 1 per 
30,000 adult males and 1 per 100,000 adult females seek the ulti­
mate in treatment for the illness: sex-reassignment surgery.96 
GID commonly affects relationships, and "many individuals 
with GID become socially isolated."97 In some instances, the condi­
tion can be so great that it affects nearly every aspect of the per­
son's life. Eventually, the person's everyday life may center around 
only those activities that tend to decrease the associated stressful 
feelings. 98 GID can also lead to incidents of substance abuse and 
attempted suicide.99 In extreme cases, individuals with GID might 
also attempt self-castration or mutilation of genitals. !0O 
GID is treatable. While psychotherapy is considered helpful, it 
is not intended to cure the illness, nor is it one of the three standard 
treatments according to the Standards of Care .101 The Standards of 
Care, which is considered to be the generally accepted course of 
treatment in the medical community, establish three types of treat­
ment options: (1) hormone therapy;102 (2) real-life experience;103 
94. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 91, at 577. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 579. See also HARRY BENJAMIN, INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA 
ASSOCIATION, THE STANDARDS OF CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS 17 (Sym­
posium Publishing, 5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter THE STANDARDS OF CARE] (providing 
information concerning the prevalence of GID and presenting data from Holland, 
which provides that "1 in 11,900 males and 1 in 30,400 females" may be afflicted with 
the illness). 
97. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 91, at 578. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. ld 
101. THE STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 96, at 27-28. 
102. Id. at 32. Hormone therapy involves the use of hormones, generally andro­
gen for females with GID and estrogens for males, for the purpose of allowing the 
patient to take on physical characteristics of the opposite sex and thereby relieve the 
distress associated with the illness. 
103. The real-life experience treatment option is considered "essential" if the goal 
of treatment is a complete transition and involves allowing the patient to "fully adopt a 
new or evolving gender role or gender presentation in everyday life." Id. at 30. See also 
Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002) (citing THE STANDARDS OF 
CARE throughout the opinion). A patient's real-life experience, as a member of the 
opposite sex, is ordinarily supplemented with hormones and requires the patient to con­
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and (3) sex-reassignment surgery.104 
The aim of the different treatment options is to provide "per­
sonal comfort with the gendered self in order to maximize overall 
psychological well-being and self-fulfillment."105 The treatment op­
tions are intended to be flexible and indiVidualized in order to en­
sure the best possible result for the patient. However, when the 
patient is a prisoner, the responsible officials in charge of maintain­
ing an orderly prison may not be willing to be as flexible as the 
Standards of Care suggest - especially when issues like security, 
politics and expense arise. The next part of this Note examines four 
early decisions that considered some of the difficult issues inherent 
in the incarceration of transsexuals. 
A. 	 Legal Actions by Prisoners Involving Gender Identity 
Disorder 
Many courts that have dealt with legal claims brought by plain­
tiffs experiencing GID have considered the condition valid and seri­
ous.1°6 However, in Lamb v. Maschner,107 the court's difficulty in 
grasping the seriousness of GID was evident. The plaintiff claimed 
to be transsexual, sought transfer to a female facility, and requested 
that the prison provide cosmetics and female clothing.108 In dis­
cussing whether the plaintiff was in fact a transsexual, the court did 
duct his or her everyday life, be it at work, at school, or in the community, in the gender 
role of the opposite sex. THE STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 96, at 30. 
104. For individuals suffering from severe or profound OlD, sex-reassignment 
surgery may be appropriate after the patient has received a "comprehensive evaluation 
by a qualified medical health professional." THE STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 96, 
at 37. The medical community does not consider sex-reassignment surgery experimen­
tal, investigational, elective, cosmetic, or by any means optional. Id. The procedure is 
invasive and requires radical alteration of the genitals for the purpose of providing the 
patient with the physical characteristics of the opposite sex. Id. at 37-38. Sex-reassign­
ment surgery can only be prescribed after all the relevant factors have been thoroughly 
assessed. 
105. 	 [d. at 3. 
106. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (finding deliberate indiffer­
ence test appropriate in case involving transsexual inmate); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 
322, 325-26 (8th Cir. 1988) (identifying the condition as "transsexualism" and reiterat­
ing the notion that "transsexualism is a very complex medical and psychological prob­
lem") (citation omitted); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) 
("[T]reatment of a psychiatric or psychological condition may present a 'serious medi­
cal need' under the Estelle formulation. There is no reason to treat transsexualism dif­
ferently than any other psychiatric disorder."). 
107. 	 633 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1986). 
108. [d. at 353. The issue of whether the plaintiff was in fact a transsexual was 
disputed by the parties who submitted conflicting medical records. [d. The court de­
cided the case, assuming arguendo, that the plaintiff was a transsexual. [d. 
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take into account that the prisoner had inflicted a laceration to his 
scrotum.109 However, the court did not consider the incident indic­
ative of mental illness but rather illustrative of the plaintiff's charac­
ter as a "non-conformist."110 Such reasoning demonstrates the lack 
of understanding that often accompanies claims involving GID and 
its unique manifestations. 
The early case of Supre v. Ricketts111 illustrated not only some 
of the complex issues involved with incarcerating transsexuals, but 
also the confusion which can exist in regards to GID. The facts of 
the case reveal that the inmate-plaintiff was in need of psychologi­
cal attention112 and had been targeted by other inmates in part be­
cause of his feminine characteristics.113 During the plaintiff's 
incarceration, he "engaged in various forms of mutilation of his sex 
organs."114 The repeated self-mutilation resulted in severe damage, 
which caused the plaintiff to undergo surgery in order to remove his 
testicles.115 In the aftermath of surgery, prison medical staff re­
fused to prescribe the inmate hormones, despite recommendations 
for hormone therapy given by outside medical professionals.116 
The Tenth Circuit found the disagreement among the medical 
professionals regarding hormone treatment to be a reflection of the 
controversial nature of treating GID.u7 Further disagreement illus­
trating not only the difficulty in treating GID, but also in litigating 
cases involving GID can be seen in the different interpretations 
taken by the district court and the court of appeals in deciding 
whether the prison officials acted appropriately. Whereas the dis­
trict court found that the prison failed to provide minimal treatment 
by not administering low cost estrogen hormones,11s the Tenth Cir­
109. Id. at 354. 
110. Id. (dismissing claim because deliberate indifference on the part of the 
prison could not be shown). 
111. 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986). The Tenth Circuit's decision involved whether 
the inmate plaintiff could be considered a "prevailing party" for purposes of deciding 
the appropriateness of the district court's award of attorney fees. Id. Nonetheless, the 
court made interesting statements regarding the treatment of prisoners with GID. The 
underlying suit involved a transsexual inmate who claimed the treatment offered by the 
prison was not adequate and therefore constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. 
112. Id. at 960. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 963. 
118. Supre v. Ricketts, 596 F. Supp. 1532, 1535 (D. Colo. 1984) ("Although it 
would not be reasonable to expect the prison system to finance an expensive sex change 
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cuit found the prison official's medical recommendations to be in­
formed and adequate.u9 Thus, the plaintiff failed to establish a 
valid Eighth Amendment claim.120 
The decisions in Lamb and Supre did little in the way of ad­
dressing the issues involved with incarcerating persons with GID.121 
The case that established at least some meaningful precedent came 
soon after Lamb and Supre. In Meriwether v. Faulkner,122 the 
plaintiff was a convicted murderer who had undergone extensive 
surgical augmentation prior to incarceration, which resulted in most 
of his123 physical characteristics resembling that of a female.124 The 
inmate had received estrogen therapy for nine years under medical 
supervision prior to incarceration.125 The plaintiff, similar to the 
plaintiffs in Lamb and Supre, alleged insufficient medical treat­
ment.126 The plaintiff also claimed the he had been humiliated by 
the Medical Director at the prison.127 Despite a prior diagnosis of 
gender dsyphoria made at the beginning of incarceration, the plain­
tiff was denied medical treatment.128 
Unlike Lamb and Supre, where both plaintiffs received some 
sort of medical treatment, the court in Meriwether found that there 
"had been a total failure to provide any kind of medical attention at 
a11."129 In discussing the inadequacy of the treatment, the court 
operation, minimal treatment was not being administered to the plaintiff; the cost of 
plaintiff's female hormones was approximately $10 a month."). 
119. Id. at 963. 
120. Id. ("[T]he Department of Corrections made an informed judgment as to the 
appropriate form of treatment and did not deliberately ignore plaintiffs medical needs. 
The medical decision not to give plaintiff estrogen until further study does no represent 
cruel and unusual punishment."). 
121. The Lamb and Supre decisions can also be seen as deferential to prison ad­
ministrators' discretion when faced with issues relating to the treatment of prisoners 
with GID. In Supre, the plaintiffs sentence was ultimately commuted because the 
prison considered the inmate to be a "management problem." [d. at 961. Similarly, the 
plaintiff in the Lamb case was eventually removed by transferring him to the State 
Security Hospital, where he underwent medical treatment. Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. 
Supp. 351,354 (D. Kan. 1986). 
122. 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987). 
123. [d. at 409 n.1. The Court used feminine pronoun because plaintiffs counsel 
referred to inmate as "she," and during review of a dismissal, a court must accept fac­
tual allegations as true. [d. 
124. Id. at 410 (noting the "surgical augmentation of her facial structure, breasts, 
and hips so as to alter her body shape to resemble that of a biological female"). 
125. Id. (treatments caused the plaintiffs chemical castration). 
126. [d. 
127. Id. The plaintiff alleged that prison's medical director had told her he would 
"make sure" she never received estrogen while in prison. [d. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. at 414. 
2005] KOSILEK V. MALONEY 239 
found that GID did constitute a serious medical need and thus 
could be reviewed under Eight Amendment scrutiny.130 The case is 
important therefore because it recognized the seriousness of GID; 
however, because of its procedural posture, the decision did little 
more.131 
Another noteworthy decision regarding the treatment of pris­
oners with GID was made by the Seventh Circuit in Maggert v. 
Hanks.132 The complaint in this case stemmed from a prisoner's 
dissatisfaction over a prison psychiatrist's refusal to provide es­
trogen therapy.B3 The psychiatrist did not find that the prisoner 
suffered from gender dsyphoria.134 Therefore, the court upheld the 
lower court's dismissal of the suit because the plaintiff failed to 
show that there was a genuine medical condition present.135 In af­
firming, the Seventh Circuit went on to address broader issues in­
volving prisoner's civil rights in relation to the treatment of gender 
identity disorders.B6 While this portion of the opinion is mostly 
dicta, it is interesting to consider the economic justification used to 
resolve whether a prison's denial of hormone therapy would rise to 
level of cruel and unusual.137 
In recognizing gender dysphoria as a serious medical disorder, 
the court did not refer to medical literature or case law. Instead, it 
considered the great physical and financial sacrifice that a person 
suffering from the condition must undergo in order to alleviate the 
associated pain.138 In commenting on the extent of a prison's duty 
130. Id. at 413 ("There is no reason to treat transsexualism differently than any 
other psychiatric disorder. Thus contrary to the district court's determination, plain­
tiff's complaint does state a 'serious medical need."'). 
131. Id. at 410. The Meriwether court was only concerned with whether the dis­
trict court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claim was proper and reviewed the dismissal 
assuming the plaintiff's allegations to be true. 
132. 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997). 
133. Id. at 670-71. 
134. Id. at 671 ("The psychiatrist does not believe that Maggert suffers from gen­
der dysphoria, although he acknowledges that Maggert's 'sexual identity is polymor­
phous and his sexual aims ambiguous."'). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 672. 
138. Id. at 671. Maggert referred to gender dysphoria as "the condition in which 
a person believes that he is imprisoned in a body of the wrong sex" and went on to refer 
to the illness as "a serious psychiatric disorder, as we know because the people afflicted 
by it will go to great lengths to cure it if they can afford the cure." [d. The court also 
recognized the surgical procedure involved in GID cases and commented that, 
"[s]omeone eager to undergo this mutilation is plainly suffering from a profound psy­
chiatric disorder." Id. 
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to treat a prisoner's GID, Judge Posner found the expense of the 
surgical treatment option important139 and discussed the expense 
factor in light of the 'Eighth Amendment's guarantee of medical 
treatment.140 It was clear to Judge Posner that a prisoner's entitle­
ment of minimal care cannot be stretched to include a costly surgi­
cal treatment option.141 However, the court did state that a prison, 
in certain special circumstances, may be required to provide costly 
medical treatment to a prisoner suffering from GID.142 In the end, 
this possibility was considered highly unlikely due to the rarity of 
the condition and its lack of acceptance and awareness in the 
community.143 
The Maggert opinion demonstrated the Seventh Circuit's con­
cern over the obvious inequity that would arise if convicts were pro­
vided with expensive medical treatment unavailable to most law­
abiding citizens.144 This and other related problems are challeng­
ing. Difficult issues surely arise for those responsible for the care 
and treatment of transsexual inmates. Determining how much a 
prison staff must do in order to fulfill its constitutional obligation to 
a transsexual inmate can be quite complicated, as the facts of the 
Kosilek case illustrate. 
III. CASE DISCUSSION 
Kosilek's demands for medical treatment began during deten­
tion in the county jail.145 At his own expense Kosilek was allowed 
139. Id. In commenting on the extent of the prison's constitutional obligation 
towards the medical needs of the prisoner, the courted stated "it does not follow that 
prisons have a duty to authorize the hormonal and surgical procedures that in most 
cases at least would be necessary to 'cure' a prisoner's gender dysphoria. Those proce­
dures are protracted and expensive." Id. 
140. Id. ("A prison is not required by the Eighth Amendment to give a prisoner 
medical care that is as good as he would receive if he were a free person, let alone an 
affluent free person. He is only entitled to minimum care.") (citation omitted). 
141. Id. at 672 ("Withholding from a prisoner an esoteric medical treatment that 
only the wealthy can afford does not strike us as a form of cruel and unusual 
punishment. "). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. ("Gender dysphoria is not, at least not yet, generally considered a severe 
enough condition to warrant expensive treatment at the expense of others than the 
person suffering from it. "). 
144. Id. In its discussion of the cost of the treatment, which "can easily reach 
$100,000" id., the court expressed concern over the possibility that severely ill individu­
als might commit crimes as a means of obtaining medical treatment. The court explic­
itly stated: "We do not want transsexuals committing crimes because it is the only route 
to obtaining a cure." Id. 
145. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 164 (D. Mass. 2002). The record 
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to consult with a medical expert qualified to treat GID.146 The 
medical expert's recommendation, which involved psychotherapy 
with a qualified practitioner in treating GID, was not followed by 
the Sheriff.147 It was also during his stay in jail that Kosilek at­
tempted to castrate himself and where he attempted suicide 
twice.148 Kosilek's demands for treatment continued after his con­
viction and transfer to the medium-security male prison at MCI­
N orfolk.149 
Ultimately, Kosilek requested the court issue an injunction re­
quiring that the prison treat his condition with a qualified medical 
professional according to recognized medical standards.150 The 
court realized that Kosilek's risk of harm was great and accepted 
that his GID was the cause of his severe emotional distress.151 The 
court then considered whether deliberate indifference had occurred 
in a systematic manner, paying particular attention to the course of 
treatment Kosilek actually received. 
A. 	 The Objective Analysis Under the Deliberate Indifference 
Standard 
In order to decide on the validity of the constitutional issue 
involved, the court needed to assure that "Kosilek had a genuine 
[GID] and, if so, what the recommended treatment would be if 
Kosilek were not incarcerated."152 The DOC retained a GID ex­
pert, Dr. Forstein, who concluded that Kosilek did have GID and 
recommended psychotherapy with a qualified therapist.153 In addi­
tion, Forstein recommended that Kosilek receive female hormones, 
consult with a specialist in sexual reassignment, and have access to 
personal items such as makeup.154 At the core of the recommenda­
tion was concern over Kosilek's potential suicidality if his condition 
revealed that Kosilek had intense feelings causing him to believe that his gender is 
female from a young age. [d. at 163. Despite the severe distress caused by these intense 
feelings, Kosilek did not seek medical treatment prior to incarceration, although there 
had been one period where Kosilek did use female hormones and for the first time in 
his life "felt normal." [d. In the late 1960s, Kosilek prostituted himself to a physician in 
exchange for the female hormones. [d. 
146. 	 [d. at 164. 
147. 	 [d. 
148. 	 [d. 
149. 	 [d. 
150. 	 [d. at 166. 
151. 	 [d. at 164-65. 
152. 	 [d. at 168. 
153. 	 [d. 
154. 	 [d. 
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was not treated.155 The doctor's report to the DOC included his 
belief that there was "a great risk for self harm, perhaps mutilation, 
if not suicide."156 The doctor's recommendations were not followed 
by the prison medical staff.157 
Kosilek's medical treatment was at all times subject to the dis­
cretion of the DOC medical staff.158 The medical staff met with 
Commissioner Maloney in order to discuss Kosilek's demands,159 
and it was clear to the medical staff from the outset of their involve­
ment that Maloney did not want to provide Kosilek with hormones 
or surgery.160 The medical personnel, who had no experience in 
treating GID, then attempted to establish a GID policy in response 
to Kosilek's legal action.161 
Relying on the medical staff's research162 and legal advice 
given by DOC attorneys,163 Maloney adopted a "freeze-frame" pol­
icy to deal with Kosilek and future issues involving the treatment of 
those with GID.164 The "freeze-frame" approach was outlined by a 
memorandum prepared by one of the prison doctors, Dr. Packer.165 
Under the new policy, 
[t]he DOC would provide hormones to any inmate who had pre­
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 168-69 (noting that the DOC medical personnel were comprised of a 
psychiatrist, who was also the director of the program that treated prisoners' mental 
health problems, and a doctor of the medical school that was contractually bound to 
provide mental health care to prisoners). 
159. Id. at 169. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 170. 
162. Id. at 169-70. Dr. Packer's recommendation was based on an article by Dr. 
Robert Dickey. Id. at 169 (citing Dr. Robert Dickey et aI., Transsexuals with the Prison 
System: An International Survey of Correctional Services Policies, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
219 (1996)). The article stated that no prisons surveyed had a policy allowing sex reas­
signment surgery. Id. In the article, Dr. Dickey claimed that the "freeze frame" ap­
proach was a sound way of dealing with the management of transsexuals. Id. The court 
pointed out that Packer's memorandum, which purported to provide "the gist of the 
article," id., did not include relevant information such as the fact "that twenty-seven of 
the sixty-four jurisdictions surveyed stated that they would decide on a case-by-case 
basis whether to initiate hormone therapy for an inmate and three more jurisdictions 
stated that they would consider initiating such treatment reasonable." Id. at 170. 
163. Id. During a meeting with his attorneys "Maloney was told that no reported 
case had held that the Constitution required initiating hormones for a prisoner not tak­
ing hormones before being incarcerated. Rather, he was told that court decisions indi­
cated that mental health counseling was sufficient treatment for an inmate with a 
gender identity disorder." Id. 
164. Id. at 171. 
165. Id. at 169. 
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viously been prescribed hormones, probably place that person in 
the general population of the prison, and deal with any security 
issues that might arise. The DOC would not, however, initiate 
hormones for an inmate for whom hormones had not been pre­
scribed prior to his incarceration.166 
Prior to formal adoption of the guidelines, Maloney. had read 
Dr. Forstein's recommendations and was aware of the numerous 
risks involved with inadequately treating GID, including acute de­
pression, self-mutilation or autocastration, and suicide.167 DOC 
employees who interacted with Kosilek the most, as well medical 
experts retained by Kosilek for purposes of trial, agreed that if ade­
quate treatment was not provided the future risk of attempted sui­
cide would be high.168 
The court found the inadequacy of Kosilek's care wholly the 
result of a rigid "blanket policy" adopted by Maloney, not because 
of sound medical advice, but rather as a result of an administrative 
decision.169 In assessing this decision, the court considered the 
agreement among medical experts who concluded that "prohibiting 
the initiation of hormones in every case is not appropriate."170 
Before concluding that treatment offered by the DOC was inade­
quate, the court found it useful to contrast the treatment of GID 
with other illnesses. It found that "if an inmate were depressed be­
cause he had cancer, the DOC would not limit its efforts to address­
ing the depression. Rather, it would also attempt to cure, or at least 
diminish, the cancer by providing care that would be regarded as 
adequate in the community."I71 
In determining whether a valid constitutional claim under the 
Eighth Amendment existed, the court made clear that the proper 
focus would be on the conduct of Maloney.l72 Maloney's actions 
166. ld. at 171 (noting that up to time that the Guidelines were drafted Dr. 
Packer was neither aware of the Standards Of Care nor Dr. Forstein's diagnosis). 
167. ld. at 171-72. 
168. ld. at 165 n.4. 
169. [d. at 175. The court stated that: 
[N]o clinical assessment of Kosilek's individual circumstances and medical 
needs has been made. Rather, major forms of the treatment provided in the 
community in the United States pursuant to prudent professional standards 
have been eliminated as options by an administrative decision made by Malo­
ney, who acknowledges that he is not qualified to decide what treatment is 
medically necessary for a particular inmate. 
ld. 
170. ld. 
171. !d. 
172. ld. at 168-69. 
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would be scrutinized not merely because he was the Commissioner 
of the DOC, but because he effectively made all major decisions 
concerning the treatment of Kosilek.173 It was Maloney's adminis­
trative decision that essentially circumscribed Kosilek's treatment 
and restricted the professional judgment of DOC medical person­
nel,174 Despite Maloney's admitted lack of medical expertise,175 it 
was his decision that controlled Kosilek's treatment; thus, deliber­
ate indifference would have to be shown on the part of Maloney.176 
1. 	 Kosilek Met the Objective Requirements of Deliberate 
Indifference 
In finding that Kosilek's GID was serious enough to warrant 
treatment, the court made certain to recognize that not every pris­
oner with GID could state a valid claim under the Eighth Amend­
ment.177 The facts presented in this case, however, demonstrated 
that Kosilek's mental illness was indeed severe.178 Besides the 
medical diagnoses of two different experts, the court considered the 
past instances of attempted suicide and mutilation as relevant to the 
issue of establishing a serious medical need,179 and the court consid­
ered the potential danger of suicide and self-mutilation still ongo­
ing.180 The court also considered prior case law and found the facts 
of the case more similar to Meriwether, where no informed medical 
judgment had been made, and less similar to the cases of Supre and 
Lamb where the prisoners had received some form of medical 
173. Id. The court stated that: 
[T]he decisions on how to deal with Kosilek and any other prisoner suffering 
from a gender identity disorders was, as a practical matter, made by Maloney 
in his capacity as the Commissioner of the DOC .... Therefore, Maloney is 
the person on whom the court must focus in determining whether the deliber­
ate indifference required to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment 
has been proven in this case. 
Id. 
174. Id. at 175. 
175. Id. at 169 ("Maloney testified ... that he was not qualified to make medical 
judgments."). 
176. Id. ("[I]t is necessary to focus on Maloney's state of mind to determine 
whether deliberate indifference has been proven."). 
177. Id. at 184 ("[Ge ]nder identity disorders have differing degrees of severity 
.... [S]ome individuals with gender identity disorders manage to find their own com­
fortable, effective ways of living ...."). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. (quoting Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997)) ("Someone 
so eager to undergo this mutilation is plainly suffering from a profound psychiatric 
disorder. "). 
180. Id. 
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care.181 
The facts revealed that the DOC deviated from its customary 
practice of retaining a medical expert in cases where the DOC staff 
was unqualified in dealing with a particular medical issue - which 
was the case with GID.182 The court ultimately found that Kosilek's 
medical treatment was determined not by qualified medical profes­
sionals or the medical staff within the DOC, but rather by Malo­
ney.183 The court found the Guidelines, which Maloney instituted, 
to be, in effect, a total prohibition of any actual treatment.l84 The 
combination of the severity of Kosilek's illness, the lack of any real 
medical treatment, and the rigid policy adopted by Maloney 
amounted to a failure to provide adequate or even essential care.185 
Thus, the court found the objective component of the deliberate 
indifference analysis satisfied.186 
B. 	 The Subjective Component of the Deliberate Indifference 
Standard 
In evaluating the subjective component of deliberate indiffer­
ence, the court wisely bifurcated the analysis. Relying on Farmer, 
the court first sought to determine whether Maloney knew of a sub­
stantial risk to Kosilek's health or safety; if he did know of a sub­
stantial risk, the court then needed to establish if Maloney 
disregarded that risk.187 The majority in Farmer, to the dismay of 
the dissent, established that "an official's failure to alleviate a sig­
nificant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no 
cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as 
the infliction of punishment."188 The facts presented in Kosilek il­
lustrated this type of case.189 
1. 	 Was Maloney Aware of Facts From Which to Infer Risk 
to Kosilek? 
The court concluded that Maloney was aware of the relevant 
facts surrounding Kosilek's circumstances, which could have ena­
181. 	 [d. at 186. 
182. 	 [d. 
183. 	 [d. 
184. 	 [d. 
185. 	 [d. at 188-89. 
186. 	 [d. at 189. 
187. 	 [d. 
188. 	 [d. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994». 
189. 	 [d. 
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bled him to infer the existence of a significant risk to the health and 
well being of Kosilek. l90 The facts that the court found relevant to 
this determination were that Maloney had read Dr. Forstein's re­
port and recommendations, which included concern regarding the 
great risk of attempted suicide by Kosilek.191 Moreover, Maloney 
had been made aware of the significant risks of harm that could 
result by inadequately treating a GID.192 These facts demonstrated 
that "Maloney was aware of facts from which he could have in­
ferred that there was an excessive risk to Kosilek's health."193 
Therefore, one of the two elements of the subjective component of 
the deliberate indifference standard had been satisfied. 
2. 	 Did Maloney Form the Belief That There Was a 

Substantial Risk of Serious Harm to Kosilek? 

The facts presented could not demonstrate that the lack of 
medical attention caused by Maloney's inflexible policy was due to 
deliberate indifference.194 Deliberate indifference could not be 
shown partially because Maloney relied on prison procedures al­
ready in place, which protected against the possibility of prisoner 
suicide.195 Interestingly, the court considered Maloney's lack of 
medical expertise a pertinent factor in his inability to appreciate the 
risks associated with Kosilek's GID.196 The court also took into ac­
count Maloney's request of legal advice in assessing whether delib­
erate indifference could be shown.197 In the end, the facts 
presented were analogous to a scenario depicted by Justice 
O'Connor in her Farmer concurrence. The court found that Malo­
ney "knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that 
the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexis­
tent. "198 This type of knowledge could not support a finding of de­
liberate indifference; therefore, the court concluded that Maloney 
had not acted with the requisite intent and entered judgment in Ma­
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 191. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. (noting that DOC attorneys had informed Maloney that no transsexual 
prisoner had been successful in arguing that the exclusion of hormone therapy was un­
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment). 
198. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994». 
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loney's favor.199 
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
It is evident from the opinion that the court thoroughly as­
sessed all relevant facts before concluding that Maloney had not 
acted with the requisite subjective motivation sufficient to support a 
finding of deliberate indifference.2oo The level of the court's in­
depth examination of the complex issues presented had not been 
achieved by prior federal court decisions. The purpose of this sec­
tion is to discuss the most important findings and recommendations 
made in the court's well-reasoned decision. 
A. The Constitutional Obligation to Provide Treatment for GID 
In certain situations, severe GID may pose a significant risk to 
a prisoner's health and safety; therefore, responsible prison officials 
should be cautious when incarcerating such an individual. The 
court in Kosilek appropriately found that GID is not "necessarily a 
serious medical need."201 GID, like most illnesses, has varying de­
grees of severity. But GID is similar to other potentially serious 
psychological conditions; thus, prison officials may have a constitu­
tional obligation to provide adequate treatment after a proper diag­
nosis has occurred.202 Like previous decisions, Kosilek affirmed 
that an inmate with GID may require a responsible prison official 
to provide adequate care.203 Similar to Meriwether, the court in 
199. Id. at 191-95. 
200. Id at 189. 
20l. Id. at 184. See also Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
("[M]erely because someone is a transsexual, it does not inexorably follow that he or 
she needs psychotherapy .... Farmer had no guarantee of psychotherapy for transsexu­
alism absent a demonstrated need."). 
202. See, e.g., Robert E. v. Lane, 530 F. Supp. 930, 938-39 (N.D. Ill. 1981). For 
the Lane court, there was no reason to treat mental illness differently than a physical 
ailment. 
Mental illness, like physical illness, occasions pain and suffering in the af­
flicted. The refusal to treat, in combination with the state's conduct in confin­
ing the individual in a manner that prevents him from getting any help on his 
own, therefore amounts to the infliction or aggravation of pain and suffering. 
Id at 938 (citing Comment, Right to Treatment for the Civilly Committed: A New Eighth 
Amendment Basis, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 747 (1978)). The court went on to cite 
numerous other courts that had adopted this rationale. Id. 
203. See Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987). In a claim 
brought by an incarcerated transsexual, the Meriwether court found that the plaintiff 
had pleaded facts "which, if proven, would entitle her to some kind of medical treat­
ment." Id. However, the court proceeded to limit its holding by stating: "It is important 
to emphasize ... that she does not have a right to any particular type of treatment ...." 
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Kosilek found it difficult to justify a failure to provide treatment for 
GID where a similar decision to not provide treatment for a differ­
ent illness, for example cancer or schizophrenia, would almost 
surely be a violation of the Eighth Amendment.204 Indeed, it is 
very difficult to attempt to distinguish one potentially serious 
mental illness, which would require treatment under the Eighth 
Amendment, from a severe case of GID. Therefore, when the in~ 
carceration of inmates who may have severe GID is at issue, the 
best approach for prison officials would be to receive an evaluation 
by a competent medical professional in order to determine the ex­
tent of the prison's duty of care. This approach, besides being the 
least risky from the prison official's perspective, is best in terms of 
policy and logic. 
The Kosilek case teaches that responsible officials charged with 
the care of a transsexual inmate should at least foster the opportu­
nity for a competent medical evaluation.205 Of course, this possibil­
ity does not necessarily mean that prisons will be obligated to pay 
for costly sex reassignment surgery. Prisons are only required to 
provide adequate treatment. Adequate treatment, for many indi­
viduals, may only require psychotherapy.206 Kosilek, however, in­
structs that the decision as to proper treatment must be made by 
medical professionals - not prison officials or the inmate.207 The 
well-established rule, which prevents liability when there is mere 
disagreement with the treatment provided, safeguards prisons later 
on if an inmate pursues legal action because the recommended 
treatment is less then what he or she hoped to receive.2og But, as 
Id. See also Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000); Wolfe v. Hom, 130 F. 
Supp. 2d 648, 652 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("Courts have consistently considered transsexualism 
a 'serious medical need' for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.") (citations omitted). 
204. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 188. In Kosilek, the court considered how the 
prison might have treated Kosilek if his illness had been cancer and concluded the 
prison policies were inconsistent. Id. ("As Hughes, testified, if Kosilek had cancer, and 
was depressed and suicidal because of that disease, the DOC would discharge its duty 
to him under the Eighth Amendment by treating both his cancer and his depression."). 
Likewise, in Meriwether, the court found it hard to distinguish between illnesses. Mer~ 
iwether, 821 F.2d at 413 ("There is no reason to treat transsexualism differently from 
than any other psychiatric disorder."). 
205. See supra note 15. 
206. See THE STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 96, at 27-28. 
207. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 160. 
208. Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998). In affirming the 
general understanding among courts, Chance held it "well-established that mere disa­
greement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim. So long as 
the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treat­
ment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation." Id. 
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Kosilek and other cases demonstrate, prison officials choosing not 
to provide any competent evaluation run the risk of violating the 
Eighth Amendment - and legal challenges based on these grounds 
will often be able to at least survive a summary judgment 
hearing.209 
B. 	 Rigid Prison Administrative Policies Do Not Provide 
Sufficient Solutions 
In assessing the objective factors under the deliberate indiffer­
ence standard, the court considered the administrative decisions 
made by Maloney and the policies instituted in order to deal with 
Kosilek's needs.210 Although the DOC revised a former policy to 
allow for the possibility of psychotropic medications to be pre­
scribed in the future, the court still found the new treatment plan 
deficient in terms of adequately treating Kosilek's illness.211 
This is one of the important findings made by the court and, in 
part, demonstrates that rigid administrative policies will not always 
be appropriate when dealing with inmates with OID.212 The court 
came to its conclusion after hearing testimony from qualified medi­
cal professionals.213 The court ultimately found that adequate 
treatment of OlD requires an "individualized medical evalua­
tion,"214 and it determined that all medical decisions should be the 
product of "sound medical judgment, based upon prudent profes­
sional standards, particularly the Standards of Care."215 While the 
court did allow Mel-Norfolk to continue with the "freeze-frame" 
policy adopted by Maloney, it made clear that future decisions re­
garding treatment would have to be individualized and not based 
209. See Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). Brooks, a 
recent challenge brought by a transsexual inmate, involved a summary judgment mo­
tion. The court concluded that "[p]rison officials are thus obliged to determine whether 
Plaintiff has a serious medical need and, if so, to provide him with at least some treat­
ment." Id. See also Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285-86 (D. N.H. 2003); 
Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 186 (finding a total failure on the part of the prison based on 
the fact that "no informed medical judgment has been made by the DOC concerning 
what treatment is necessary to treat adequately Kosilek's severe gender identity disor­
der"); Wolfe v. Horn, 130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 
413 (reversing the lower court's finding that plaintiff had not stated a valid Eighth 
Amendment claim, which might have entitled her to treatment if proven). 
210. 	 Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 174. 
211. 	 Id. at 174-76. 
212. 	 Id. at 175. 
213. 	 Id. 
214. 	 Id. at 193 (citing Allard v. Gomez, 9 Fed. Appx. 793,795 (2001)). 
215. 	 Id. (citations omitted). 
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solely on blanket policy.216 
The court found the DOC's policy regarding the treatment of 
GID distinct from its policy relating to the treatment of other seri­
ous illnesses.217 The reason for the distinction between the DOC's 
policies is hard to reconcile and troublesome in light of other court 
decisions. The Second Circuit has suggested that the decisions re­
lating to prisoners' medical care should be the product of "sound 
medical judgment. "218 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has found that 
medical decisions that are not based on "individualized medical 
evaluation" create triable issues as to the determination of deliber­
ate indifference.219 Most recently, a federal district court in New 
York found that "[p]rison officials cannot deny transsexual inmates 
all medical treatment simply by referring to a prison policy which 
makes a seemingly arbitrary distinction between inmates who were 
and were not diagnosed with GID prior to incarceration."22o These 
decisions, at a minimum, demonstrate that the adoption of a rigid 
administrative policy does not absolve prison administrators from 
the Eighth Amendment's requirements.221 
Policies which severely restrict treatment options, and which 
do not provide opportunity for an individualized medical evalua­
tion, may run counter to notions underlying the Eighth Amend­
ment.222 This may be especially true, as Kosilek illustrates, when 
facts and circumstances indicate that a prisoner has a medical con­
dition that poses a serious risk of harm to either themselves or 
other inmates. In contrast, policies with some flexibility, which pro­
vide opportunity for evaluation by professionals who implement 
medical procedures similar to those practiced in the community, do 
not present a similar risk. These notions prove true when one con­
siders the guiding principle of the Amendment, which involves 
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur­
ing society."223 Certainly medicine, and especially the study of 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 176. 
218. Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1998). 
219. Allard, 9 Fed. Appx. at 795. 
220. Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
221. See Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286 (D. N.H. 2003) (illustrating 
the most recent acceptance of this idea). The Bartlett court cited Kosilek when it stated 
that: "A blanket policy that prohibits a prison's medical staff from making a medical 
determination of an individual inmate's medical needs and prescribing and providing 
adequate care to treat those needs violates the Eighth Amendment." Id. 
222. Id. See also Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 181-83. 
223. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
101 (1958». 
2005] KOSILEK V. MALONEY 251 

mental illness, is constantly developing, and congruently, society 
becomes more aware of different types of illness and their potential 
seriousness. If prison policies do not provide enough flexibility, by 
not accounting for such inevitable medical progress, Eighth 
Amendment challenges will have a greater likelihood of success as 
prisoners will claim that the failure to provide opportunity for indi­
vidualized attention creates a "substantial risk of serious harm."224 
If prison officials adopted Kosilek's preferred method of pro­
viding opportunity for individualized evaluations it would be diffi­
cult for a prisoner-plaintiff to establish a valid constitutional 
violation under the Eighth Amendment. In Kosilek, the court con­
sidered Maloney's belief that existing DOC procedures would pre­
vent serious harm to Kosilek relevant in deciding the issue of 
deliberate indifference.225 The court ultimately found that the pro­
cedures were incapable of accomplishing this purpose.226 In order 
to avoid this uncertainty, as to whether a prison policy provides 
constitutionally adequate measures of safety and care, the Kosilek 
opinion seems to offer a reasonable solution. Prison officials 
should secure themselves from potential liability by adopting poli­
cies that can surely be seen as adequate when measured under the 
microscope of deliberate indifference. This can be almost certainly 
be achieved by allowing inmates the opportunity for individualized 
medical attention with a qualified professional experienced in the 
treatment of GID. Kosilek can thus be seen as a warning to prison 
officials - "an Eighth Amendment violation may be established by 
proof of failure to adjust an established policy to accommodate a 
serious medical need. "227 
C. Political Considerations 
In analyzing Maloney's decision-making process, the court 
found that the DOC Commissioner erroneously considered the po­
tential of politically controversial consequences.228 Maloney's con­
224. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 
225. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 186-87. 
226. Id. at 188-90. 
227. Id. at 186 (finding this point implicit in Mahan v. Plymouth County House of 
Corrections, 64 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995». 
228. Kosilek determined that "Maloney has not been influenced by the possibility 
that treatment for Kosilek might be expensive. Rather, he has been concerned that any 
expenditure for hormones or sex reassignment surgery might be an inappropriate use of 
taxpayers' money." Id. at 162. The court also noted that "Maloney believed that pro­
viding Kosilek with hormones or sex reassignment surgery would raise security issues, 
and be politically controversial and unpopular." Id. at 191. 
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cern over political controversy was not directly related to the 
expense of the treatment requested by Kosilek.229 Rather, the 
court found that Maloney believed it would be an "inappropriate 
use of taxpayers' money" to provide treatment, such as hormones 
or surgery.230 The court considered this factor improper where the 
pertinent issue involved the extent of medical treatment Kosilek 
was to receive and found political controversy a poor excuse for 
denying the constitutional right to adequate medical care.231 Ac­
cording to Kosilek, prison officials need not consider political 
ramifications, or political fallout, regarding their decisions to pro­
vide medical care.232 
The rationale for the court's position concerning the role of 
political consequences was clearly expressed when it stated that 
[t]he Bill of Rights provides citizens, including those who are in­
carcerated, with certain rights that even a majority of their con­
temporaries cannot properly decide to violate. Prison officials 
share with the courts the duty to protect those rights, even if they 
believe that it may be unpopular to do SO.233 
This powerful idea, interpreting the Bill of Rights as specific 
guarantees that may not be abridged even when a popular majority 
might disagree with the course of action, is at the heart of 
Kosilek.234 This idea represents an important aspect of the Kosilek 
opinion and should be appreciated, not only by courts, but also by 
prison administrators. Determining the level of treatment to which 
a prisoner, and especially a murderer, is entitled can certainly spark 
strong sentiment from even the most apolitical individuals. The 
court in Kosilek understood this and wisely attempted to limit the 
political influences as much as possible. By focusing solely on the 
seriousness of the medical need at issue and the responsiveness of 
the DOC, the court adeptly avoided the political trap that Commis­
sioner Maloney could not. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 162. 
231. Id. at 192 ("[C]oncern for controversy is not a constitutionally permissible 
basis for denying an inmate necessary medical care."). 
232. Id. at 162. 
233. Id. 
234. The court's impartial focus on the issues presented is evident throughout the 
opinion. Indeed, its quest for objectivity can be gleaned from the following statement: 
"Kosilek's claims raise issues involving substantial jurisprudence concerning the appli­
cation of the Eighth Amendment to inmates with serious medical needs. This case re­
quires the neutral application of the principles that emerge from that jurisprudence to 
the facts established by the evidence in this case." Id. at 160. 
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A disturbing aspect of the Kosilek case is that Maloney, who 
was not a medical professional nor qualified to make decisions re­
lating to health care, "effectively precluded qualified professionals" 
from providing Kosilek with treatment.235 In fact, Maloney's ac­
tions were based mainly on reasons other than medical considera­
tions,236 and the decisions that were made were based primarily on 
legal advice given by attorneys, who had informed Maloney that a 
court had never required prescription of hormones for a pris­
oner.237 The court found that Maloney would not have allowed 
Kosilek to receive hormones, or sex reassignment surgery, "unless 
the law required him to do SO"238 and described Maloney's deci­
sion-making process as a "major problem" in the case and rightly 
SO.239 
While the Supreme Court has afforded prison administrators 
considerable deference regarding matters of prison security and 
regulations involving "legitimate penological interests,"240 the 
Court has not, since Estelle, been similarly deferential when a legiti­
mate medical need is at issue.241 Therefore, Kosilek correctly 
downplayed the politically controversial issues related to the incar­
ceration and treatment of individuals with GID. It becomes diffi­
cult and potentially dangerous to justify the prohibition of medical 
treatment based on political notions, even otherwise persuasive no­
tions such as leaving such decisions to the majority's will. The argu­
235. Id. at 191. 
236. Id. ("A major problem in this matter is that Kosilek's condition has been 
treated primarily as presenting legal issues rather than medical questions."). 
237. Id. ("Maloney was substantially influenced by his attorneys' advice that, as 
of April 2000, no court had held that the Eighth Amendment required prison officials 
to provide hormones for an inmate for whom they had not been prescribed prior to his 
incarceration. "). 
238. /d. 
239. Id. The court recognized that the information given to Maloney by the at­
torneys was relevant to the issue of whether Maloney should have been held personally 
liable for damages or whether he deserved "qualified immunity." Id. However, the 
court explained that the legal advice given to Maloney would not alone have provided 
protection from the determination of whether he had the requisite knowledge in deter­
mining the issue of deliberate indifference. Id. 
240. See Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229-30 (2001) (referencing a four-part 
balancing test used to measure the extent to which a regulation impinges upon an in­
mate's constitutional rights); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576,591 (1984) (citing Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)) ("We reaffirm that 'proper deference to the informed 
discretion of prison authorities demands that they, and not the courts, make the difficult 
judgments which reconcile conflicting claims affecting the security of the institution, the 
welfare of the prison staff, and the property rights of the detainees."'). 
241. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 
294, 303 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). 
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ment made by those who would allow prisons or states the right to 
prohibit costly medical treatment of inmates cannot be justified 
solely on the grounds that a plurality of voters would support such a 
decision without compromising notions underlying the Bill of 
Rights and Supreme Court precedent.242 
The question of whether a "majority of the population [would] 
support such a punishment"243 may be useful in determining 
whether a specific practice runs counter to "standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society."244 However, the is­
sue regarding political consequences addressed by Kosilek is 
different. 
The court found that prison administrators do not have the au­
thority to make decisions that ultimately affect an inmate's medical 
care because they feel that most citizens in the state might disagree 
with the course of action.245 In the court's view, Maloney had an 
inflexible constitutional duty to provide adequate treatment, and 
political concerns could not be used to determine what the ade­
quate treatment should or should not have been.246 Reasons of pol­
icy and logic justify this conclusion. The appropriateness of costly 
medical treatment, in most situations, is an issue of constitutional 
magnitude with which courts and legislatures - not prison adminis­
trators - are equipped to deal.247 Giving prison officials the author­
ity to restrict medical care based on political considerations raises a 
242. See Bradley A. Sultan, Note, Transsexual Prisoners: How Much Treatment Is 
Enough?, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1195, 1225 (2003). Sultan argues that transsexual pris­
oners receive only the most basic medical care and considers whether a popular major­
ity would agree with allowing medical treatment for transsexual prisoners. While not 
referring to any actual polls or data the author states that "[c]learly ... one may deter­
mine that the prohibitions on treatments for the indigent transsexuals are supported by 
the majority of Americans ...." Id. at 1224-25. 
243. Id. at 1224. Sultan relies on the Supreme Court decision in Gregg v. Geor­
gia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), which reinstated the death penalty. Id. at 1224 n.211. How­
ever, there is a relevant distinction between a majority's acceptance of capital 
punishment and whether prisoners should receive costly medical treatment. When cap­
ital punishment is imposed it is done through court decision and relates directly to the 
crime for which the person has been found gUilty. In contrast, a prison's constitutional 
obligation to provide medical treatment has never, since Estelle, been subject to com­
promise, challenge, or referendum. Estelle clearly established that the government's 
obligation to provide medical treatment was "elementary." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 103 (1976). In sum, there exists a relevant distinction between the constitutionality 
of a specific type of criminal punishment and the constitutionality of depriving prison­
ers of medical treatment. The latter issue has never been seriously questioned in toto. 
244. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
245. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 162 (D. Mass. 2002). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
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serious threat to Estelle's guarantee of adequate medical treatment, 
and the practice should therefore be condemned by courts. 
Despite the improper restrictions on Kosilek's treatment,248 
Maloney did consider legitimate concerns in handling Kosilek's sit­
uation.249 It was of course reasonable for Maloney to be cautious in 
deciding whether an inmate should receive treatment that would 
result in the enhancement of female characteristics.250 Security 
concerns are of utmost importantance for all prison administra­
tors.251 Kosilek recognized that prison officials dealing with the is­
sue of treating transsexual prisoners will not only have to deal with 
the unique medical needs of the prisoner, but also the security is­
sues inevitably raised by the housing of a prisoner resembling a 
member of the opposite sex. These challenging considerations are 
the focus of the next section. 
D. Treating GID Behind Prison Walls and Security Concerns 
In Kosilek, the court held that "judgments concerning the care 
to be provided to inmates for their serious medical needs generally 
must be based on medical considerations."252 The statement begs 
the question: when should a prisoner's right to medical care be out­
weighed by the security concerns that the treatment brings about? 
It may be helpful to first consider this difficult question in the ab­
stract, according to Supreme Court case law. 
In Whitley v. Albers ,253 the Court found that 
the State's responsibility to attend to the medical need of prison­
ers does not ordinarily clash with other equally important gov­
ernmental responsibilities. Consequently 'deliberate indifference 
to a prisoner's serious illness or injury' can typically be estab­
lished or disproved without the necessity of balancing competing 
institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff or other 
inmates.254 
Like Wilson, which recognized that deliberate indifference 
248. ld. at 161 ("Qualified physicians have never evaluated Kosilek for the pri­
mary purpose of prescribing treatment. "). 
249. ld. at 162. 
250. ld. 
251. ld. See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,832-33 (1994); Helling v. Mc-
Kinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37 (1993). 
252. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (emphasis added). 
253. 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 
254. [d. at 320. 
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"depends upon the constraints facing the official,"255 Helling v. Mc­
Kinney256 reaffirmed the importance of "the realities of prison ad­
ministration."257 Thus, the issue of whether the treatment of GID 
clashes with prison administration may be extremely important to 
the success or failure of future challenges brought by transsexual 
inmates. 
In some circumstances, it is plausible that the treatment may 
raise genuine security concerns to a level where it must be prohib­
ited in order to protect the safety of the transsexual inmate. How­
ever, in Kosilek, the court seemed to suggest that this was not the 
case. In the closing paragraphs of the opinion, the court implied 
that sex reassignment surgery would not necessarily be precluded 
given the facts and circumstances involved.258 The court even sug­
gested that if sex reassignment surgery was deemed medically nec­
essary in the future, Maloney would have to "consider whether 
security requirements make it truly necessary to deny Kosilek ade­
quate care."259 Because "Kosilek is already living largely as a fe­
male in the general population of a medium security male prison" 
and "[t]his has not presented security problems,"26o the court cast 
doubt upon Maloney's ability to meet such a burden. 
Although the court was not required to decide upon any other 
issue besides deliberate indifference, it made interesting recommen­
dations to the DOC in order to deal with Kosilek's condition more 
effectively in the future.261 Unlike previous decisions, the court did 
not overlook the inevitable problems that may arise when incarcer­
ating transsexual inmates receiving treatment while in prison, and 
the court recognized that responsible officials should proceed with 
caution.262 The court took notice of the security issues and Malo­
255. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). 
256. 509 U.S. 25 (1993). 
257. Id. at 37. 
258. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 195 (D. Mass. 2002). 
259. Id. (emphasis added). 
260. Id. at 194. 
261. Id. at 193. Finding it unlikely that prison officials would act indifferently 
towards Kosilek in the future, the court 
expect[ed] that, educated by the trial record and this decision, Maloney and 
his colleagues will in the future attempt to discharge properly their constitu­
tional duties to Kosilek .... While concerns about security and public contro­
versy have made [Maloney] reluctant to do more for Kosilek than the law 
requires, the court does not expect that Maloney will be recalcitrant in the 
future. 
Id. 
262. Id. at 193-94. 
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ney's sincere concern over the possibility of sexual assault. 263 How­
ever, in the end, the court maintained that Kosilek could be 
provided with adequate care and pointed to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Hudson v. Palmer,264 requiring officials to "take reason­
able measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. "265 The court 
then suggested that the DOC "make reasonable efforts to incarcer­
ate [Kosilek] with a less dangerous population of other 
prisoners. "266 
Although these suggestions were specific to the facts surround­
ing the case, they offer novel and interesting suggestions as to how 
prison officials should deal with the incarceration of transsexuals. 
Could "reasonable efforts to incarcerate [Kosilek] with a less dan­
gerous population"267 include a transfer to a female facility? The 
transfer of male transsexual inmates, who are undergoing treat­
ment, to a female facility raises one possible option for prison offi­
cials;268 however, prison systems place inmates based on rigid 
gender classifications; therefore this option seems unrealistic.269 
On the other hand, male transsexuals, like Kosilek, are often 
targets of abuse in male facilities.270 Accordingly, the court's sug­
gestion of placing Kosilek in a facility with a less dangerous popula­
tion seems reasonable under the circumstances and seems to be the 
option with the least potential for problems.271 Kosilek's transfer to 
a facility with less dangerous offenders would lessen the potential 
for harm and increase Kosilek's safety and thereby mitigate some of 
263. Id. at 170 ("Maloney expressed sincere and serious concerns about security 
within the prison if Kosilek or any other inmate were to receive hormones or sex reas­
signment surgery. Maloney understood that twenty-five percent of the inmates in his 
custody were sex offenders."). See also id. at 194 (clarifying that the court did "not 
intend to denigrate the significance of Maloney's security concerns"). 
264. 468 U.S. 517 (1984). 
265. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp 2d at 194 (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526-27). 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. See Crosby v. Reynolds, 763 F. Supp. 666, 669-70 (D. Me. 1991). In Crosby, 
the court considered whether housing a preoperative transsexual with females violates a 
clearly established constitutional right. Ultimately, it found the "contours" of the right 
to privacy unclear when "it comes to the determination of where to house transsexu­
als." [d. at 670. 
269. Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners 
Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 523-24 (2000). 
270. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 852 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring); 
Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997); Crosby, 763 F. Supp. at 669. 
271. Cf. Maggert, 131 F.3d at 672 (suggesting assignment to protective custody 
may offer a solution). 
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the security concerns. Of course, the transfer should be condi- . 
tioned on Kosilek's past behavior and present dangerousness. 
Treating GID in prison may be challenging considering the un­
usual treatment options. However, the Standards of Care are in­
tended to be flexible in order to adapt to the patient's unique 
situation.2n Thus, decisions involving a specific course of an in­
mate's treatment should ultimately be made on a case-by-case basis. 
In some cases, treatment may pose few problems, especially if the 
recommended treatment consists only of psychotherapy. But if the 
recommended treatment consists of the implementation of hor­
mones, prison administrators might want to consider whether it is 
possible to place the inmate in a setting that decreases potential 
security concerns. It is difficult to come to any real solution when 
balancing medical needs with "the realities of prison administra­
tion."273 However, Kosilek clearly provides that prisons cannot 
simply foreclose the possibility of treatment without potentially 
running afoul of the Eighth Amendment. 
E. The Expense of Providing Treatment for GID 
Lastly, the court considered the issue of cost. Kosilek directly 
challenged the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Maggert, in which Judge 
Posner opined on the economic limits that might affect the treat­
ment of transsexual prisoners.274 In Kosilek, the judge was not per­
suaded by the Seventh Circuit's reliance on cost as a potential 
reason to deny the administration of hormone therapy or sex reas­
signment surgery.275 The court considered this focus on cost mis­
guided and fundamentally inconsistent with precedent.276 The main 
flaw in Maggert ultimately had to do with the Supreme Court's de­
cision in Estelle.277 In Maggert, Judge Posner considered the ineq­
uity of providing costly treatment to convicts when they would not 
be able to afford treatment had they not broken the law.278 The 
court in Kosilek found this argument unconvincing because, in con­
trast to law-abiding citizens, prisoners have a right to medical 
272. STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 96, at l. 
273. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37 (1993). 
274. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 192 (D. Mass. 2002). 
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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care.279 This distinction is important and raises the issue of equity, 
which is at the core of most people's disagreement and outrage over 
providing treatment to transsexual inmates. 
Judge Posner pointed to this inequity in Maggert and had diffi­
culty finding any cruelty in denying a prisoner costly treatment.280 
However, it becomes difficult to determine what is, or is not, cruel 
and unusual by focusing solely on the expense of treatment. If cost 
is the sole criteria, where must society draw the line? Should courts 
only allow treatment for illnesses that are inexpensive to treat? 
Some might go a step further and argue that Estelle should be over­
turned; perhaps convicted criminals deserve no more than the ap­
proximately 41.2 million law-abiding Americans who are without 
health insurance. 
Estelle, however, remains controlling and provides the re­
sponse to the questions posed, proper or not: "[E]lementary princi­
ples establish the government's obligation to provide medical care 
for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. "281 Because the 
Supreme Court has never provided economic limitations to this 
rule,282 the court in Kosilek could not agree with the reasoning in 
Maggert and thus refused to restrict Kosilek's future treatment on 
the grounds that it might prove expensive.283 In defense of its posi­
tion, the court pointed to the relatively inexpensive cost of hor­
mones and compared the costs associated with the treatment of 
GID to other forms of potentially expensive treatments.284 
The court's position relating to the issue of cost is part of the 
innovative analysis of the complex legal issues associated with the 
incarceration of transsexuals. In sum, the court maintained that the 
279. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 192 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 
(1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831 (1970». 
280. See Maggert, 131 F. 3d at 672. The Maggert court held that 
Withholding from a prisoner an esoteric medical treatment that only the 
wealthy can afford does not strike us as a form of cruel and unusual punish­
ment. It is not unusual; and we cannot see what is cruel about refusing a bene­
fit to a person who could not have obtained the benefit if he had refrained 
from committing crimes. 
Id. 
281. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
282. See Barbara Kritchevsky, Is There a Cost Defense? Budgetary Constraints as 
a Defense in Civil Rights Litigation, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 483, 497 (2004) ("The Supreme 
Court has done little to resolve the question of whether budgetary constraints can ne­
gate culpability and enable a defendant to avoid Eighth Amendment liability."). 
283. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 192. 
284. Id. ("There is no showing that providing sex reassignment surgery for 
Kosilek would be more expensive than the treatments provided to some inmates with 
cancer, kidney failure, or any other serious medical condition."). 
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treatment of GID should be no different than the treatment of 
other medical conditions.285 Such reasoning is part of what makes 
the Kosilek decision noteworthy. Future challenges by transsexual 
inmates involving allegations of inadequate treatment will reveal 
whether the Kosilek approach becomes influential. 
CONCLUSION 
GID can be a serious condition, and in some cases the conse­
quences of failing to provide adequate treatment can be grave. The 
Kosilek opinion offers new and valuable perspectives to the chal­
lenging issues that courts, as well as prison administrators, face in 
responding to the needs of inmates experiencing moderate to se­
vere G ID. Kosilek does not provide all the answers; however, the 
decision takes a step forward in the direction of recognizing that 
inmates with GID present special issues and, in certain circum­
stances, require adequate medical treatment under the Eighth 
Amendment. The Kosilek approach comports best with Supreme 
Court precedent and with the standards of decency and humanity 
that underlie the Eighth Amendment because the court solely con­
sidered the medical need at issue without being influenced by 
prejudice, cost, or politics. 
Nikolas Andreopoulos * 
285. Id. at 192 ("[W]e are, fundamentally, a decent people, and decent people do 
not allow other human beings in their custody to suffer needlessly from serious illness 
or injury.").
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